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Yazzie v. EPA, 851 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2017) 
 
Caitlin C. Buzzas 
 
  
 In Yazzie v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the EPA’s 
discretion in its adoption of a federal implementation plan under the 
Clean Air Act for a coal-fired power plant on the Navajo Nation 
Reservation that reduced power generation at the plant, imposed a cap on 
total emissions of nitrogen oxides, and required that the plant cease coal-
fired power generation by end of 2044. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In Yazzie v. EPA, tribal conservation organizations and non-profit 
environmental organizations challenged the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) source-specific Federal Implementation 
Plan (“FIP”) under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) for a coal-fired power plant 
on the Navajo Nation Reservation in Arizona.1  
 The Ninth Circuit held that the federal government’s partial 
ownership of the Navajo Generating Station (“Station”) “did not eliminate 
any deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA and its 
implementing regulations.”2 The court stated that the EPA had reasonably 
concluded that because the Navajo Nation had not submitted a Tribal 
Implementation Plan (“TIP”), the Tribal Authority Rule (“TAR”) applied, 
giving the EPA authority to implement a FIP at the Station.3 Moreover, 
the court held that the EPA correctly interpreted the TAR and the CAA’s 
Regional Haze Regulation to conclude that emission reductions did not 
apply to FIPs for regional haze that are enacted in place of TIPs. The court 
further stated that it was reasonable for the EPA to give an emission credit 
to the Station when evaluating if the BART alternative resulted in greater 
emission reductions, and therefore it deferred to the EPA in its 
determination that the FIP alternative for nitrous oxide emissions was a 
“better than BART” alternative.4 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Requirements and History of the CAA 
 
 Under the CAA, each state submits a State Implementation Plan 
(“SIP”) to the EPA that sets forth emission limits to improve air visibility 
under the Regional Haze Regulations.5 If a SIP is rejected or the State does 
not submit one, the EPA must create a FIP to fill in any resulting regulatory 
                                                          
1  Yazzie v. EPA, 851 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2017). 
2  Id.  
3  Id.  
4  Id.  
5  Id.  
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gaps.6 A SIP must identify the “best available retrofit technology” 
(“BART”) to reduce emissions from major emission sources.7 A State can 
bypass a BART by enacting a “‘better than BART’” alternative.8 Under 
the “better than BART” alternative for Regional Haze Regulations, a SIP 
requires that the necessary emissions reductions “take place during the 
first long-term strategy for regional haze” and “in no event later than five 
years.”9 However, it is disputed whether this deadline applies to a FIP 
enacted in place of a TIP under the TAR, rather than a SIP.10 For tribes, 
the EPA issued a special TAR which allows tribes to develop their own 
TIP similar to a SIP.11 However, Tribes are not required to adopt a TIP, so 
a TAR authorizes the EPA to enact a FIP to fill in gaps to meet emission 
goals under the Regional Haze Regulations.12  
 Amendments to the CAA in 1990 expanded its focus to include 
the visibility impairment caused by air pollutant emissions from 
“numerous sources located over a wide geographic area,” known as 
regional haze.13 To reach the goal of achieving natural visibility by 2064, 
the CAA requests that each State submit a SIP to the EPA setting forth 
“emission limits and other measures necessary to make reasonable 
progress toward the national visibility goal.”14 SIPs must identify the 
BART to reduce admissions, and any source subject to the BART must 
install and operate the technology “as expeditiously as practicable” and 
within five years after approval of a SIP or FIP.15 To circumvent the BART 
with a “better than BART” alternative, the State’s SIP must have all the 
necessary emission reductions taking place within the “first long-term 
strategy” of the plan16 and show the alternative will achieve “greater 
reasonable progress” than would have resulted from the BART.”17 There 
are three different methods to show that an alternative will result in 
“greater reasonable progress”:(1) “[i]f the distribution of emissions is not 
substantially different than under BART, and the alternative measure 
results in greater emission reductions”; (2) “if the distribution of emissions 
is significantly different,” “dispersion modeling” must be conducted, 
“which focuses on visibility rather than emissions”; or (3) “otherwise 
based on the clear weight of the evidence.”18 
 The TAR arose from the CAA Amendments that authorized the 
EPA to “treat Indian Tribes as States if certain conditions were met, and 
                                                          
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. (quoting Arizona ex. rel. Darwin v. EPA, 815 F.3d 519, 526 (9th 
Cir. 2016)). 
9  Id. at 969 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(e)(2)(iii)). 
10  Id. 
11  Id.  
12  Id. 
13  Id. at 966. 
14  Id.  
15  Id.  
16  Id. 
17  Id. at 972. 
18  Id. at 972. 
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to issue regulations outlining when that treatment should occur.”19 The 
TAR treats eligible tribes “in the same manner as States with respect to all 
provisions” of the implementation of regulations under the CAA “except 
for mandatory plan submittal deadlines.”20 Since Tribes are not required 
to adopt TIPs, the EPA must implement “without unreasonable delay” 
provisions to protect air quality in the absence of tribal provisions.21 
However, the TAR exempts tribes from certain CAA requirements such 
as specific visibility deadlines and allows the EPA more time to implement 
a FIP for a tribe than a State because States are farther along in the 
development, planning, and implementation of air quality expertise.22 
 
B. The Navajo Nation Station’s FIP 
 
 The Station is the “largest coal-fired plant in the western United 
States.”23 Its emission of nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) affects the visibility at 
major national parks and wilderness areas including the Grand Canyon.24 
The Station also powers a major water distribution system for Arizona and 
is a significant employer and revenue generator for the Navajo Nation.25 
Four utilities and the Department of Interior (through the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation) co-own the Station under a lease from the Navajo Nation.26 
The Navajo Nation is barred from controlling or regulating the operation 
of the Station under the lease.27 Under the proposed amended lease, the 
Station would operate as is until 2044, after which the Navajo Nation could 
continue its operation of the Station, but would have to do so as a “new 
source” that generates electricity without coal.28  
 The Navajo Nation did not issue a TIP for the Station, so the EPA 
issued a proposed FIP that offered both a BART determination and BART 
alternative.29 The BART determination would reduce NOx emissions by 
almost 80% within 5 years of the final FIP.30 The BART alternative 
extended the deadline for NOx emission reductions to 2023 and gave an 
“emission credit” for the Stations previous installation of low NOx 
technology.31 
 After a supplemental proposal, the final rule imposed a lifetime 
cap on NOx emissions (ending in 2044), reduced power generation, 
finalized a longer deadline of emission reductions, and issued an emission 
                                                          
19  Id. at 966. 
20  Id.  
21  Id.  
22  Id. at 967. 
23  Id. at 965. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id.  
30  Id.  
31  Id.  
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credit.32 The EPA concluded that the plan qualified as a “better than 
BART” alternative.33 In addition, the EPA stated that a “more flexible, 
extended compliance schedule was warranted due to (1) the Station’s 
unusual and significant challenges; and (2) the EPA’s discretion under the 
TAR.”34 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the challenge to the EPA under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which states that final agency 
action shall be upheld unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.”35 This is a “highly 
deferential” standard, with deference to an agency’s interpretation of an 
administrative statute governed by two questions – “steps” – laid out in 
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., v. NRDC.36 The first step under Chevron looks at 
whether Congress “addressed the precise question at issue.”37 If Congress 
was unambiguous in its intent on the issue, then the court must give effect 
to Congress’s express intent.38 If the statute is “silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue,” the court must look at “whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”39 
Additionally, “an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is 
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”40 
 The court made its decision based on several factors including the 
statutory BART deadlines required by the CAA, the eligibility of tribes to 
be treated as States, the substantive and procedural deadlines of tribes 
under the CAA, and if the FIP was a “better than BART alternative.” 
  
A. BART deadlines required by the CAA 
 
 The Petitioners, Vincent Yazzie, and several tribal conservation 
and non-profit environmental organizations, contended the EPA failed to 
comply with the CAA statutory deadline that a BART must be 
implemented within five years of “the promulgation of a FIP.”41 However, 
the court found that the CAA’s five-year deadline did not apply because 
the FIP proposed a “better than BART” alternative, and the deadline only 
applies to BART.42  
                                                          
32  Id. 
33  Id.  
34  Id.  
35  Id. at 968. 
36  Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)). 
37  Id.  
38  Id. 
39  Id.  
40  Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S. Ct. 905, 
137 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1997)). 
41  Id.  
42  Id.  
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B. Eligibility of Tribes to be treated as States 
 
 Petitioners also argued that because the Navajo Nation had 
contracted its power to regulate the Station to the State, it was not 
“eligible” for treatment as a State under TAR. 43 However, the court held 
that the CAA “mentions nothing about a tribe’s eligibility” and applies “so 
long as a tribe does not submit an approved TIP”.44 The court indicated 
that the CAA authorizes the EPA to treat tribes as States if they meet 
certain requirements,45 which includes a reasonable expectation that tribes 
are “capable, in the judgement of [the EPA], of carrying out the functions 
to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes” of all 
applicable regulations.46 Additionally, the court highlighted that if the 
EPA determines that treating tribes the same as States is “inappropriate or 
administratively infeasible” the EPA may provide other means by which 
it “will directly administer such provisions so as to achieve the appropriate 
purpose.”47 This, the court found, the EPA did through the TAR provision, 
which provides that the EPA shall provide Federal implementation plans 
that “are necessary or appropriate to protect air quality . . . if a tribe does 
not submit a tribal implementation plan . . . or does not receive EPA 
approval . . . .”48 Further, the court found that under an additional provision 
of the CAA the EPA is authorized “to adopt a FIP when a tribe is not 
treated as a State.”49 Therefore, the court held that the EPA had correctly 
applied the TAR because the Navajo Nation had not submitted a TIP, and 
the EPA had authority to implement a FIP for NOx emissions at the 
Station.50 
 
C. Application of CAA Substantive or Procedural deadlines to Tribes 
 
 The Petitioners argued that the EPA’s interpretation of the 
language and purpose of the CAA is incorrect and any flexibility under the 
TAR only applies to procedural or submission deadlines, not substantive 
or compliance deadlines.51 The EPA contended that the Navajo Nation 
Station was not subject to this deadline because it only applies when a 
State adopts a BART alternative, 52 and under the TAR, tribes are exempt 
from “[s]pecific visibility implementation plan submittal deadlines” under 
the CAA.53 Moreover, the EPA argues that the TAR entitles it to establish 
                                                          
43  Id. at 970. 
44  Id.  
45  Id.  
46  Id.  
47  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(4)). 
48  Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 49.11(a)). 
49  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(4)). 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 971 (referencing 40 C.F.R. § 49.4(e); 70 Fed. Reg. at 39,158). 
52  Id.  
53  Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 49.4(e)). 
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different deadlines for the FIP and the deadline here is “explicitly tied to 
the period of the first long-term strategy” which States had to submit by 
2007, but tribes were not subject to.54  
 The court looked to the Tenth Circuit decision in Arizona Public 
Service Co. v. United States EPA which held that “TAR only excused 
tribes from meeting procedural requirements” and that “[n]othing in the 
TAR requires the FIP to comply with the regional haze deadlines 
applicable to a SIP.”55 Further, the court stated that it could not say that 
the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation was erroneous or 
inconsistent.56 The court held that “the EPA reasonably interpreted the 
TAR . . . and the Regional Haze Regulations . . . to conclude that the 
emission reductions deadline . . . does not apply to FIPs for regional haze 
that are promulgated in place of TIPs.”57 
 
D. The EPA FIP Alternative is “Better than BART” 
 
 The Petitioners next contended that the EPA failed to show “by 
the clear weight of evidence” that the alternative achieved greater progress 
than BART.58 Of the three different methods to show a “better than 
BART” alternative the EPA relied on the first method – that the 
“distribution of emissions” was not substantially different than BART and 
the alternative resulted in “greater emission reductions.”59 
 The court found that the “clear weight of the evidence” standard 
only applied to the third method, and the EPA chose the first method.60 
The court reasoned that there are “three separate methods” to establish 
that an alternative is “better than Bart” and that the State can either use the 
two quantitative measures in the first method or the qualitative method in 
the third.61 The first method does not incorporate the “clear weight of 
evidence” standard, and thus the court found that the EPA was only 
required to show “distribution of emissions” was “not substantially 
different” and the alternative would result in “greater emission 
reductions.”62 Similarly, the court noted that the EPA did not have to 
conduct visibility modeling required under the second method.63 
 The Petitioners stated that the EPA did not meet the first prong of 
the method because “distribution of emissions” should include both 
                                                          
54  Id. at 970. 
55  Id. at 971 (referencing Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States EPA, 
562 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
56  Id. at 970 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 at 461 (U.S. Feb. 
19, 1997)). 
57  Id. at 972. 
58 Id. 
59  Id.  
60  Id. at 972. 
61  Id. (citing WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 770 F.3d 919, 934 (10th 
Cir. 2014). 
62  Id.  
63  Id.  
2017 Yazzie. v. United States EPA  7 
geographic and temporal distribution.64 The court indicated that the plain 
language of the regulation under the first method does not indicate whether 
the “distribution of emissions” is geographic (i.e., locations/sources of the 
emissions), temporal (i.e., the timing of the emissions) or both.65 However, 
the EPA has consistently interpreted “distribution of emissions” to refer 
only to the geographic distribution of emissions.66 Thus, the EPA 
concluded that the distribution of emissions between BART and the FIP’s 
BART alternative was not substantially different because geographic 
distribution of emissions is similar as they both apply to the same source 
– the Station.”67 Additionally, the EPA noted this interpretation was 
reasonable as where there is only one source being regulated – as is case 
here – if emissions are reduced, visibility is improved.68 The court held 
that the BART alternative regulatory deadline does not apply to an FIP 
enacted under the TAR as the key inquiry is whether the EPA is required 
to consider timing in evaluating the “distribution of emissions” prong.69 
Further, the court stated that it “must defer to the EPA’s interpretation.”70 
 The Petitioners additionally argued that the FIP’s BART 
alternative did not meet the second prong of the first method because it did 
not result in “greater emission reductions”.71 The BART alternative 
incorporated an emission credit for the Station’s voluntary instillation of 
NOx reducing technology.72 “Absent this credit the BART alternative 
would not achieve greater NOx reductions than BART.”73 Therefore, the 
question was if it was reasonable for the EPA to give the Station an 
emission credit when evaluating if the BART alternative resulted in 
greater emission reductions.74 The Petitioners argued that the 
incorporation of the credit into the alternative calculation was inconsistent 
with the EPA’s prior statement on the BART and therefore was 
unreasonable.75 They further argued that the EPA was inconsistent in 
factoring the emission credit in computing the emission reductions under 
BART.76 However, the EPA did not consider the credit in the BART 
determination, but only for evaluating alternatives to BART.77 Therefore, 
the EPA’s incorporation of the credit was not inconsistent with its prior 
statement.78 Moreover, the TAR gave the EPA discretion to allow a credit 
                                                          
64  Id.  
65  Id. at 973. 
66  Id. (citing § 51.308(e)(3)). 
67  Id.  
68  Id.  
69  Id.  
70  Id.  
71  Id. at 974. 
72  Id.  
73  Id.  
74  Id. at 974.  
75  Id.  
76  Id.  
77  Id.  
78  Id.  
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for the BART alternative.79 The Court held that the TAR grants the EPA 
wide latitude to determine what plan provisions are necessary to protect 
air quality for a source on tribal lands when there is no TIP.80 Therefore, 
it was reasonable for the EPA to give the Station an emission credit when 
evaluating if the BART alternative resulted in greater emission reductions 
and it deferred to the EPA’s reasonable determination that the FIP 
alternative was “better than BART.”81 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
  The outcome of Yazzie v. United States EPA affirms the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision to give an entity more flexibility in complying with 
regulations if those decisions are entitled to the implementing Agency’s 
deference. The court held that the EPA did not abuse its discretion when 
it adopted a FIP under the Clean Air Act for a coal-fired power plant on 
the Navajo Nation Reservation that reduced power generation at the 
plant, imposed cap on total emissions of nitrogen oxides, and required 
that the plant cease conventional coal-fired power generation by end of 
2044. Additionally, the court took into account the Station’s voluntary 
compliance technology, the tribe’s interests in the Station, and that the 
Station would cease to use coal at all in the future as factors in deciding 
the discretion allowed by the EPA. The Ninth Circuit denied the petitions 
stating that “In light of the discretion that the EPA enjoys, we cannot 
conclude that, under these unique circumstance, the EPA acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously.82 
                                                          
79  Id.  
80  Id.  
81  Id.  
82  Id. at 975. 
